Mechanism design

Results: 750



#Item
101Auction theory / Game theory / Mechanism design / Auctions / Mathematics / Decision theory / Submodular set function / Competitive equilibrium / Gross substitutes / First-price sealed-bid auction / Auction / Valuation

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #7: Submodular Valuations∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-04 12:07:39
102Game theory / Economics / Decision theory / Marketing / Mechanism design / Algorithmic game theory / Auction theory / Auction / Dynamic pricing / Aula / Algorithmic

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Source URL: www.games2016.nl

Language: English - Date: 2016-07-19 04:17:11
103Mathematics / Algebraic geometry / Gross substitutes / Valuation / Competitive equilibrium / Submodular set function / Mechanism design

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Bonus Lecture: Gross Substitutes and Greedy Algorithms∗ Tim Roughgarden† February 7, 2014

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-25 14:30:24
104Game theory / Nash equilibrium / Mechanism design / Cocoa

Mechanism Design By Creditability Raphael Eidenbenz Yvonne Anne Oswald* Stefan Schmid** Roger Wattenhofer * speaker

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Source URL: disco.ethz.ch

Language: English - Date: 2014-09-26 08:36:25
105Mechanism design / Mathematics / Algebraic geometry / Field theory / Valuation / Constructible universe / Game theory / Auction theory

CS364B: Exercise Set #5 Optional (no due date) Lecture 9 Exercises Exercise 28 (Optional – Do Not Hand In) Let x be a maximal-in-distributional-range (MIDR) allocation rule. Recall that coupling x with the payment

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-06 14:03:54
106Auction theory / Mechanism design / Game theory / Marketing / Market economics) / Auction / First-price sealed-bid auction / Multiunit auction / Prior-independent mechanism

Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders Elias Koutsoupias London

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Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2013-10-31 12:50:34
107Economy / Business / Professional studies / Market structure / Mechanism design / Game theory / Social choice theory / Economic equilibrium / Revenue management / Monopoly / Economics / Demand

Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown Demand: Name-Your-Own-Price. Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack∗ May 16, 2015

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Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-08 20:46:28
108Auction theory / Game theory / Mechanism design / Auctions / Decision theory / Gaming / Vickrey auction / Revelation principle / Auction / Prior-independent mechanism / English auction / Incentive compatibility

A Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Stanford University We study interdependent value settings [Milgrom and Weberand extend se

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-12-08 09:31:37
109Statistical theory / Estimation theory / Statistics / M-estimators

Corrigendum to“Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents” [J. Econ. Theory–217]∗ Daniel Kr¨ahmer† and Roland Strausz‡ Abstract

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Source URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2011-04-26 10:36:24
110Game theory / Social choice theory / Decision theory / Mechanism design / Public choice theory / Politics / Political philosophy / Voting theory / Incentive compatibility / Voting system / Preference / Voting

Optimal Voting Rules Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Xianwen Shi July 31, 2016 Abstract We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e., utilitarian)

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Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2016-07-31 07:25:14
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